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CONCEPTUALIZING RISK AND SOCIAL 
INNOVATION: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
FOR RISK GOVERNANCE 
Sarah-Sophie Flemig and Stephen Osborne 
 
Abstract 
Public policy seeks innovation as a solution to society’s big problems, yet it almost always fails 
to address one key component of innovation: risk. Furthermore, risk management in public 
policy predominately focuses on the minimization or even avoidance of risk, no matter its 
nature. This article focuses on the nexus between risk and social innovation specifically in 
public policy. It acknowledges the special context of decision-making in public policy and 
proposes two differentiations that are necessary for a holistic model of risk management in 
public policy innovation: Firstly, the differentiation between cases of risk and uncertainty; and, 
secondly, between hard and soft risk management approaches. Concluding, the chapter 
presents a framework that can inform public policy makers and practitioners alike regarding 
risk management and its effect on social innovation. 
Introduction 
Innovation is an imperative of public policy: In a time of resource constraint governments, 
innovation of public services has become a sine qua non of keeping up with society’s needs. 
Yet, little attention has been given to its flipside: taking risks. More generally, risk, and how to 
manage it, has become a central theme of the social sciences (see for instance a collection of 
social science writing on risk edited by Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). Firmly rooted in the 
actuarial sciences and engineering, social science scholars have acknowledged the importance 
of how risk is perceived, constructed, and managed. This ranges from classical financial risk 
management to the fields of public health, disaster studies, sociology, social policy, political 
science, and the health and safety studies (for a good overview, see Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 
2006). In this chapter, we will narrow our focus on the relationship between risk and social 
innovation in a public policy context. 
 
Innovation and risk taking are inextricably linked. Public policy is no exception in this regard. 
As Hartley aptly states “[i]nnovation, by definition, is uncertain in both process and outcome” 
(Hartley, 2013). Tidd and Bessant (2009) estimate that about 45% of innovation projects in the 
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private sector fail while over 50% exceed their initial budget and/or timeline. Numbers in the 
public sector are likely to be similar but empirical evidence is rare. Yet, it remains a common 
notion that the public sector is inherently risk adverse1 (Jayasuriya, 2004; Patterson et al., 
2009), while governments demand increasingly more (risky) innovation (e.g. DIUS, 2008). In 
the light of Current economic rigors and media scrutiny of any form of public policy (Patterson 
et al. 2009), an aversion to risk does not seem surprising. 
 
Despite this, even those who claim to acknowledge the connection between risk and social 
innovation have little to say by ways of how to balance risk and innovation. London-based think 
tank Nesta (National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts), for instance, dedicates 
a single line to the question of risk in public service innovation, acknowledging that it is – 
indeed – “important” (Nesta, 2013). 
 
This chapter on the nexus of risk and social innovation in public policy critically reviews the 
literature as to the current state of knowledge. In the subsequent sections, we introduce two key 
propositions based on a differentiated treatment of risk: We distinguish between the effects of 
risk and uncertainty and highlight the role of reputational risk for public policy innovation. 
Based on these propositions, we suggest a holistic model of risk management and social 
innovation in public policy contexts. 
Defining Risk and Social Innovation 
 
Featuring widely across the academic literature – as well as common parlance – both “risk” and 
“innovation” are terms with many meanings. This is itself problematic and leads to a lack of 
definitional clarity. For sociologists, risk is studied as a social construct (e.g. Green, 1997 and 
1999; Zinn 2008a and 2008b), while financial management scholars mainly focus on actuarial 
risks defined in monetary terms (e.g. Andreeva et al., 2014). 
 
Our focus is a public policy context for both scholars and practitioners. In other words, the 
question is how risk and social innovation in a public policy context differs from other social 
sciences. For this purpose, we adopt Brown and Osborne’s (2013) preferred definition of 
innovation as “the intentional introduction and application within a role, group or organization 
                                                        
1 The UK National Audit Office reports that six in ten public sector managers feared the risk of missing an opportunity 
to improve service delivery because of a general tendency for risk minimization (UK National Audit Office, 2000: p.5). 
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of ideas, processes, products or procedures, new to the relevant unit of adoption, designed to 
significantly benefit the individual, the group organization or wider society” (West and Farr, 
1990:3). As such, innovation is not synonymous with any change process. Rather, it is “a 
distinctive category of discontinuous change that offers special challenges to policymakers and 
service managers alike” (Brown and Osborne, 2013: 188).  
 
Such innovation in public policy can furthermore be categorized into evolutionary innovation, 
expansionary innovation, and total innovation (Brown and Osborne, 2013: 198). Evolutionary 
innovation denotes new skills or capacities that are used to address an existing need; 
expansionary innovation describes new needs that are being addressed by existing policies, 
skills or capacities. Finally, total innovation stands for a new need being addressed by a new 
skills or capacities (Brown and Osborne, 2013: 199). Brown and Osborne stipulate that 
technocratic risk management provides a framework for evolutionary innovation, while 
decisionistic risk management can accommodate evolutionary and expansionary innovation. 
Transparent risk governance, on the other hand, provides the most comprehensive framework 
that also provides a suitable framework for total innovation. 
 
Furthermore, Brown and Osborne (2013) suggest that risk can be conceptualized on three 
different levels (“locus of risk”): consequential risk at the level of the individual, organizational 
risk on the level of the organization and its staff, and behavioral risk at the level of the wider 
community and environment. This matches Renn’s (2008) differentiation between three 
approaches to risk: technocratic risk management, decisionistic risk management, and 
transparent risk governance. 
 
Technocratic risk management is based on the minimization of risk through expert decision-
making. Risk, in this view, can be defined objectively and minimized through scientific 
evidence (Brown and Osborne, 2013: 197). However, Renn points out the shortcomings of 
technocratic risk management, which are bounded rationality in all human decision-making and 
the fact that (acceptable) risk is more often socially constructed than it is objectively defined 
(ibid). 
 
Decisionistic risk management extends technocratic risk management by including into the 
process the possibility of discourse on the evaluation of identifiable risks. While risk is now 
vetted in both positive and negative terms, the decision authority in Renn’s decisionistic risk 
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management is still limited to politicians, excluding a vast number of other stakeholders. This 
leads to a limited point of view from which risk is being analyzed (Brown and Osborne, 2013: 
p.195). 
 
Finally, Renn’s third approach, transparent risk governance “is the core of a genuine 
engagement with the nature, perceptions and contested benefits of risk in complex situations” 
(Brown and Osborne, 2013: p.198). This approach is inclusive of all key stakeholders and 
transparent in its decision-making, a process that is aided by new Information and 
Communication Technologies that help to connect stakeholders in public services. Brown and 
Osborne suggest that this description fits most closely to the risk environment of modern public 
policy and propose, therefore, that “risk governance, rather than risk minimization or 
management, is the appropriate framework for understanding and negotiating risk in innovation 
in public services” (Brown and Osborne, 2013: p.198). 
Current Scholarship on Risk and Social Innovation 
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the literature on risk and social innovation in a public 
policy context. There are five main works relevant to the public policy context, corroborating 
Brown and Osborne’s (2013) findings. These are Harman, 1994; Hood, 2002; Lodge, 2009; 
Vincent, 1996 and Bhatta (2003). Whereas Harman discusses the negative impact of risk 
management on public sector accountability, Vincent argues that the public eye is fiercely 
watchful of public sector activities, leading to increased risk management as a means of 
avoiding the blame of other officials and the wider public. Along similar lines, Hood introduces 
the imagery of risk management as a “blame game”. Risk management on his account is about 
avoiding blame and/or attributing it to other parties. Lodge, finally, suggests that different 
“variations in instruments” (Lodge, 2009: p. 399) are necessary to offer effective risk 
management in the public sector. He also identifies the obsession with regulation to ‘insulate’ 
public policies from risk and advocates a more complex system of risk appraisal that moves 
beyond Hood’s observed “blame game”.  
 
Bhatta (2003) also acknowledges the gap in empirical knowledge regarding the relationship 
between risk and innovation in public policy. In particular, he notes that there is a qualitative 
difference between the public sector and the private sector as far as risk is concerned – namely 
the existence of ‘wicked problems’ and the fact that decisions, even when made under 
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uncertainty, need to live up to the standards of democratic scrutiny rather than being unilateral 
‘executive decisions’2  (Bhatta, 2003: p.2). “Wicked problems” (Churchman, 1967) denote 
problems that are either very difficult or impossible to solve due to a host of factors, such as 
competing moral values, interdependencies, lack of information, etc. Public services are 
particularly prone to such wicked problems because allocation choices do not just result in 
monetary differences, but are attached to public goods, such as health or defense. Moreover, 
media scrutiny has increased rapidly over the last 50 years, and public service organizations 
have had to battle numerous scandals of mismanagement and service failure. 
 
This means that success – unlike in the private sector – cannot be judged “on average”: even if 
the majority of a public organization’s service decisions turn out to be beneficial and successful, 
there is still little tolerance for any sort of even occasional ‘failure’. This leads to “playing safe” 
behavior and “incremental pluralistic policy formation that enables the policies to move 
forward but only marginally at a time” (Bhatta, 2003: p.6). Bhatta concludes that, if innovation 
in the sense set out in this paper is truly to happen, we must learn more about the factors that 
influence public service managers’ risk appetite; he suggests different institutional, contextual 
and political variables that could be explored in this context (Bhatta, 2003: p. 9). 
 
Relaxing our research criteria, we widened our literature review to include a wider scope of 
scholarship. This led to the inclusion of four additional areas of literature, which we will provide 
at this stage: 
 
1) Financial Accountability and Risk 
As described by Brown and Osborne (2013), risk management in the public sector is usually 
associated with a technocratic, quantitative assessment of potential financial risk. One stream 
of this literature associates this financial due-diligence and technocratic risk management with 
democratic/public accountability. A special issue of Financial Accountability and Management 
(August 2014) dedicated to public sector risk entails two articles that – while not directly 
addressing innovation – offer interesting insights for the innovation process in public service 
organisations (PSOs). Palermo (2014) finds that risk managers themselves are a source of 
innovation in the public sector by defining best practices for their respective service area (p. 
337). He also emphasises that key skills for the successful risk manager include communication 
                                                        
2 While this is a de facto possibility even in democratic systems, there is always a potential loss of reputation and, at 
worst, votes that looms as a consequence, even if a decision should prove overall beneficial. 
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and relational abilities. Far from the technocratic approach, Palermo suggests that soft skills 
and experiential learning evolve new risk management techniques. This experiential 
communication approach rooted in technocratic financial accountability could apply to all three 
different types of innovation described by Brown and Osborne (2013). Empirical testing 
beyond Palermo’s case study will be necessary however to show whether such flexible 
approaches really can accommodate innovation in a more flexible way.  
 
Similarly, Andreeva et al. (2014) argue that risk management all too often results in regulation. 
Hard guidelines, however, result in a loss of flexibility that can stifle innovation. Regulations 
also do not address unforeseeable risks; rather, their rigidity often makes it even harder to 
address previously unanticipated risks. PSOs are thus not necessarily better insulated from risk 
just because of regulatory standards. Rather, they suggest, “knowledgeable oversight” should 
be exercised, offering a more flexible approach to risk management, much akin to Palermo’s 
relational communications model. However, the responsibility for the provision and 
maintenance of public good provision and the balancing of market failures is no longer solely 
in the hand of governments. Andreeva et al. (2014) find that such “knowledgeable oversight” 
is exercised by a wider group of stakeholders, including the private and the non-profit sectors. 
At the same time, this dilution of responsibility also poses important new challenges to 
accountability for public services. 
 
What both papers demonstrate is that accountability and risk management are inextricably 
linked in public service provision. For ease of scrutiny and comparison, financial data seem to 
remain the preferred unit of measurement. Risk management and democratic accountability are 
thus two sides of one coin. As Bhatta (2003) suggests, creating more capacity for innovation in 
public services will require a change in the sector’s risk aversion and in the context that 
produces this phenomenon. Introducing new forms of accountability through novel regulatory 
approaches that move beyond the numbers seem to be one strategy of doing so, at least based 
on Palermo’s case study findings. This also resonates with Renn’s (2008) third approach of risk 
governance. 
 
2) Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
 
If risk management is a form of public accountability in the democratic process, and 
accountability requirements, vice versa, are among the main reasons for public sector risk 
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aversion, the question arises who is actually accountable for which risk in public service 
provision. As Andreeva et al. (2014) demonstrate, accountability is spread across different 
actors that go beyond the public sector. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) (i.e. the contracting 
out of services to for profit and non-profit organisations) has not only been hailed as a 
potentially significant source of innovation, it has also become common practice across 
advanced welfare states (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deriner, 2005). 
 
Evaluating Labour’s encouragement of PPPs, Hood and McGarvey (2002) found that Scottish 
local authorities tended to make inefficient risk allocation choices when it came to PPPs. In 
particular, they highlighted that there was too little awareness of risk management in 
collaborations across different sectors. Most importantly, they noted that the inability to manage 
risk efficiently and effectively was what led PPPs to lag behind commercial operators in terms 
of value for money and innovation. 
 
Four years later, Hood et al. (2006) also pointed out that PPPs “have been criticised as 
representing poor value for money” (p.40) and highlighted that a lack of transparency in risk 
management – on both sides – was inhibiting democratic accountability. Further research will 
need to show whether this could also apply to the potential to innovate. 
 
In a non-peer reviewed discussion paper, Lewis (2001) also described PPPs as essentially risk-
sharing relationships between the public and the private sector, and links the optimal allocation 
of risk to efficiency and innovation in outcomes. However, Lewis does not describe what such 
an optimal risk allocation would look like. 
 
One particular form of PPP that is said to promote innovation is the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), however, the evidence is at best ambivalent. The PFI is a special form of PPP that “relates 
to the provision of capital assets for the public service” following a “highly prescriptive legal 
framework” (Ball and King, 2006). Based on their review of the literature, Ball and King (2006) 
argue that risk transfer is key for a PFI to deliver value for money. Data from various 
assessments (e.g. HM Treasury Task Force, 2000; Commission on Public Private Partnerships, 
2001; National Audit Office, 1997 and 2000) however, suggest that risk is inefficiently 
allocated and outcomes not superior to those provided by the public sector only. On the 
contrary, PFI projects tended often tended to lead to negative outcomes, such as higher costs or 
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severe time delays (Ball and King, for instance, posit that “it might require £1 billion to bring 
the stock of PFI schools up to standard” in Scotland alone; Ball and King, 2006: 39). 
 
More recently, Ball et al. (2007) concluded that that the risk transfer between the public and the 
private sector is asymmetric in so far as “if things go well […] the private sector will benefit, 
but if things turn out badly then the public sector client finds it hard to exact the penalty regime 
laid down” (Ball et al., 2007: 289). This confirms a similar conclusion previously made by the 
Commission on Public Private Partnerships (2001). Ball et al. furthermore formulated three 
policy recommendations. These were that evidence-based risk assessment should be preferred 
over purely subjective risk assessment (the latter remaining the standard in the public sector), 
if there were few but crucial risks, then risk transfer should concentrate on these, and that 
contracts and indicated figures should be seen as estimates that require thorough risk 
assessments in order to fully appreciate their value. 
 
More positively, on the other hand, Corner (2006) used British data to evaluate the PFI and 
found it ambivalent regarding risk allocation and cost efficiency, but also, as innovation driver. 
However, this is contingent on efficient risk management. He concluded that the advantage of 
the PFI had been to shift the risk focus away from a purely financial perspective to decisions 
about efficient risk allocation in the delivery of services. 
 
Based on Laughlin’s previous work on PFIs, Broadbent et al. (2008) furthermore analyse PFIs 
in the context of the British National Health Service (NHS). They find that actuarial risk 
management prevails in PFIs, i.e. the predominant focus on quantitative risk management 
crowds out more qualitative concerns, such as reputation or social risks. In subsequent project 
evaluations, PFIs also followed a strict accounting logic in terms of retrospective risk analysis, 
which led to a narrow emphasis on certain quantitative risks while all qualitative risks were 
ignored. Broadbent et al (2008) suggest that efficient risk allocation in PFIs must take into 
account both quantitative as well as qualitative risks in decision-making processes, which can 
only be achieved if risk management approaches move beyond a strict accounting basis. 
 
Finally, Wall and Connolly (2009) build on Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) previous analysis 
of the performance of PFIs in the UK. They acknowledge that previous appraisals of PFIs have 
been largely negative, but instead point to a slow, but steady learning curve. For instance, they 
find that a similar level of public service infrastructure investment would not have been possible 
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without the PFI. At the same time, Wall and Connolly caution that the transfer of risk will 
always entail one stronger and one weaker contracting partner. They welcome further 
developments in the refinement of PFI structures and contracts. 
 
 
3) Economics Literature on Risk 
The economics literature on risk offers further insights on the contextual factors that link 
uncertainty and risk to innovation (e.g. Varian, 1992; Mack, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Mack juxtaposes how risk and uncertainty can affect innovative alternatives in public 
services. She suggests that PSOs may use uncertainty as a tool to deselect innovative 
alternatives, although their “net utility (…) could be expected to be greater than that of the tried 
and true” (Mack, 1971: p. 5). The more uncertainty is attached to a particular option, the more 
likely it is to be discarded, uncertainty weighing as a criterion against its expected benefits.  
However, uncertainty can also work in favour of innovation. Mack suggests that uncertainty 
can provide some “leeway for a rearrangement of fact and emphasis” (p.7). In other words, 
uncertainty may mask potential risks or potentially undesirable outcomes that are associated 
with a particular innovative option, which enables its proponents to enact it. Uncertainty of 
results is thus a contextual variable, and may work as a barrier or a driver of innovation at the 
same time. 
 
On risk, Mack also emphasises the importance of context. As long as a potential risk is known 
and considered manageable, it is not necessarily a barrier to innovation. However, other 
contextual factors, such as political accountability, may deter PSOs from choosing innovative 
service options that are associated with risks deemed unacceptable or inopportune, even if they 
are manageable. Renn’s (2008) discussion of the social construction of risk provides further 
evidence for Mack’s point. 
 
 
4) Practitioner’s Guides 
 
Treating more specific scenarios and/or audiences, think tanks and international organisations 
have been publishing practitioner’s guides on managing risk and innovation. However, their 
usefulness for extrapolating wider best practice findings is limited in scope.  
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Brown and Osborne (2013) refer to guides published by think tanks, such as the National 
Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts (NESTA) and the Young Foundation 
(NESTA/Young Foundation, 2008). The UK government has furthermore issued broad 
guidance (Brown and Osborne (2013) cite HM Treasury, 2004; NAO, 2000 and 2001; the Audit 
Commission, 2007; and the UK White Paper “Innovation Nation, DIUS, 2008). None of these 
publications, however, offers concrete policy recommendations or a conceptual nexus of 
innovation and risk beyond the acknowledgment that the two are related. 
 
In a British context, Michael Power (2004) discusses “The Risk Management or Everything” 
for London-based think tank Demos. Arguing that risk pervades every decision but is 
particularly relevant for the public sector since it aggregates responsibility for its citizens, 
Power also points to the “moral economy” of risk (p. 60). He concludes that, while more 
attention to risk has led to overall better decision-making in government, what needs to be 
addressed is the sector’s occupation with reputational risk management over quality. This, so 
he concludes, prevents important innovation in public services (p.60). 
 
There is also a dedicated membership organisation for risk management professionals in the 
public sector and in public services, ALARM. Its goal is to provide a pool of shared knowledge 
focused on making “a positive contribution to loss reduction in the Public Sector” (ALARM 
website). This mission statement highlights the organisation’s understanding of risk 
management in what Renn (2008) denotes as technocratic risk management with a narrow 
emphasis on the minimisation of financial risk. 
 
Similarly, the CCAF addresses a North American audience and suggests that innovation and 
risk management do not necessarily have to cancel each other out as long as formal rules are 
minimised and regularly reviewed for their continued relevance. This is referred to as “tailored 
rules” and confirms the importance of flexibility mentioned by previous strands of the 
theoretical literature. 
 
The World Bank published a discussion paper on “Innovations and Risk Taking” (Campbell 
1997) in the context of local government in Latin American and the Caribbean. While the 
content is very much geared towards the context of Latin America and emerging democracies, 
the report concludes that decentralising decision-making and the spread of responsibility across 
different levels of government – with a preference for bringing the responsibility of services to 
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the lowest possible level of government – can spur innovation on a local level. This insight may 
be of value for public services, however, further research is required to assess the applicability 
of Campbell’s (1997) findings for PSOs. 
 
The aforementioned practitioner’s guides provide, in certain cases, some empirical evidence 
that can help us understand how different approaches to risk management affect innovation in 
PSOs. Some echo findings from the more theoretical research literature presented beforehand. 
For instance, Campbell’s (1997) policy recommendation for the spread of responsibility for risk 
management to all levels of a PSO confirms the gist of Palermo’s (2014) decentralised 
communication model. ALARM and the CCAF firmly stand in the more traditional fields of 
the actuarial risk and health and safety literatures and do not engage with the concept of 
innovative behaviour as a separate goal of risk management. Power’s (2004) “moral economy” 
and its effects on risk management take up Renn’s (2008) concept of socially constructed risk. 
It also reinforces Hood’s (2012) “blame game” approach, emphasising that risk management 
may be a political exercise for PSOs in which reputational risk is a constant factor in the 
delivery of public services. 
 
 
Literature Review: Conclusion 
Including these additional strands of literature into our consideration of risk and social 
innovation in public policy has highlighted some further leads: The financial risk management 
literature has considerable widened beyond a technocratic risk management approach, now 
including soft factors, such as communication structures (Palermo, 2014) or the division of 
responsibility for risk management (Andreeva et al. (2014)). Empirical evidence on PPPs has 
been mixed at best, with PFIs in particular being criticised for their inefficient allocation of risk 
and their effect on obstructing rather than spurring innovation in public services, at least outside 
of Australia (e.g. McGarvey, 2004, Ball et al. (2010)). Moreover, PSOs do not seem to be 
intrinsically more risk averse than the private industry (Bozeman and Kingsley (1998)), 
although Hood and Rothstein (2008) caution that media scrutiny and political accountability 
are strongest for PSOs, affecting their approach to risk management. This is also confirmed by 
Hartley (2013), and further developed by Hood (2012) in his work on “blame game” strategies, 
evidence for which has been found in the field of medical professionals regulation by Flemig 
(2015). The economic literature and its differentiated assessment of the sometimes 
counteracting effects of risk and uncertainty on innovative behaviour in PSOs further 
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emphasises that importance of differentiating between the two concepts. Finally, practitioner’s 
guides provide some empirical support for the theoretical findings, be it in a Latin American 
(Campbell, 1997), British (ALARM, Power, 2004) or North American (CCAF) context. 
 
Let us return to our initial question: What distinguishes risk and social innovation in the context 
of public policy from other social sciences? The aforementioned literature suggests two main 
factors: reputation and accountability. As Hood’s blame game illustrates, public accountability 
among different policy makers increases the importance of reputation, trying to minimize blame 
and to maximize praise. In addition to more traditional forms of risk, such as financial/actuarial 
risks and health and safety risks, there is thus a strong reputational risk element in public policy 
making that we will focus on in the following section. 
Reputational Risk, Public Accountability and Social Innovation 
 
Because of the importance of reputational risk and public accountability, innovation in the 
public policy context requires a framework of risk management that goes beyond the traditional 
models. In this section, we explore the underlying assumptions that shape such a framework. 
Does the public policy context differ from e.g. innovation in the private sector? And if so, how? 
Most importantly, how can we address reputational risk? 
 
Firstly, there is an assumption that risk aversion dominates the public sector (Borins, 2014). 
However, there is more to the story. Bozeman and Kingsley (1998), for instance, challenge this 
assumption. Their study finds “very little evidence of the incidence of risk aversion or that the 
incidence is greater in the public than in the private sector” (p.116). Instead, they identify three 
factors as indicative of the risk approach taken by any organization: 1) the more trust employees 
feel they have from their superiors, the more calculated risks they are willing to take; 2) clarity 
of goals also leads to a more open risk approach; and 3) the more formalism and red tape, the 
more risk averse an organization’s culture. Thus, factors such as size and management style 
seem to be more indicative of an organization’s risk management approach than the 
differentiation between public and private sectors. Hartley (2013) confirms this by comparing 
public and private features of innovation, indicating that an organization’s size and maturity in 
particular may account for differences in innovation behavior. 
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Secondly, the literature links reputational risk and the need for accountability in public policy 
innovation to transparency. Hartley (2013) points out that the public sector can learn from the 
private sector as regards decision-making processes. For instance, she suggests that public 
sector organizations adapt traditional management tools, such as constructive challenge 
meetings or competitor analysis (Hartley, 2013: 53). Hartley however notes that accountability 
markedly differs from the private to the public sector. The democratic values on which public 
policies are based demand a high degree of transparency at all stages of innovation. As Hartley 
describes this scrutiny, public policy is made “the full glare of media publicity” (p. 54). 
 
This ties in with Hood’s aforementioned model of the blame game, which dominates the public 
policy literature on risk and its possible nexus to innovation. As described beforehand, the 
blame game affects risk management at all stages of the policy process. Because public scrutiny 
and the potential cost of being associated with a failure are high, there is an incentive for those 
in decision-making powers (on an individual and organizational level) to shift risks to other 
stakeholders within their policy network. 
 
Hood and Rothstein (2000) further elaborate that reputational risk is associated with risks to 
third parties and to the service providers themselves (p.1). Therefore, they criticize the one-
size-fits-all approach that has been adopted across the public sector. Like the private sector, 
Hood and Rothstein argue, public policy makers need to adapt their risk management strategies 
to the specific type of risk and point in the policy process in order to reach similar levels of 
innovation and efficiency. In their view, this can be achieved through a systemic approach to 
risk management, based on open and extensive deliberation and communication across and not 
just within policy domains. 
 
Feller’s (1981) concept of “public-sector innovation as ‘conspicuous production’” aligns with 
both Hartley’s and Hood’s findings. He argues that the qualitative context of public policy 
requires policy makers to use innovation as a proxy measure of actual performance. Innovation 
thus becomes “conspicuous production”, with blame or praise attributed to failing or successful 
innovators. Given the negative cost associated with failure, individual public policy makers 
therefore often require an additional incentive to innovate such as reward schemes, for instance 
innovation prizes (e.g. Borins, 2014 in the context of the USA). 
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Two Propositions  
 
Based on the insights from the previous sections, we now introduce two propositions that will 
help us formulate a specific public policy framework for risk and social innovation. This model 
will be discussed in the final section. 
 
Proposition 1: Risk management approaches should differentiation between risk and 
uncertainty and their potential effects on innovation. 
 
There is a difference between the effects of risk in the classical sense, i.e. potential risks that 
are known a priori, and uncertainty, i.e. unquantifiable risk that can only be recognized a 
posteriori (for a thorough treatment of risk and uncertainty, see Mack, 1971). As mentioned in 
the previous section, these two types of risk are likely to have different, and probably even 
conflicting, influences on social innovation. Therefore, we propose that they require different 
risk management approaches when it comes to spurring innovation in public policy. The 
underlying reasoning is as follows: Known risks can be assumed to drive innovation in so far 
as they provide the opportunity to find new ways of harnessing these known risks (e.g. new 
waste management techniques in environmental sustainability, new medication in mental health 
treatment, etc.). Thus, known risks most likely spur expansionary innovation. 
 
At the same time, these known risks may also be barriers to innovation, namely through 
regulatory and contracting specifications they invite. Statutory bodies initially bear 
responsibility for all service risks that they then selectively transfer to service providers if 
necessary. Quantifiable risks are often addressed through extensive regulation and other 
attempts to make control and minimize risk. In service contracts, this is likely to lead to a 
decreased potential for innovation – innovation may be ‘in breach of contract’ although it may 
bring a net benefit for all parties involved. 
 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, can spur innovation by ways of sudden shocks. Since 
uncertainty is unquantifiable and cannot be known ex ante, the innovation it can potentially 
spur is likely to be of spontaneous nature and not planned. At the same time, as findings from 
the private sector suggest, environments and organizations that are prone to high levels of 
uncertainty will be perceived as “riskier” overall and there may be a decreased willingness for 
innovation or in fact any change that deviates from the status quo (Bozeman and Kingsley, 
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1998; Mack, 1971). In this case, the approaches described by Palermo (2014) and Andreeva et 
al. (2014) on informal and more extensive communication networks across the entire 
organization provide strategies for PSOs to manage uncertainty. Uncertainty can thus only be 
managed through an organizational culture open to constant change. Innovation spurred by 
uncertainty is therefore likely to be total, encompassing new skills and new needs to be 
addressed. This follows the reasoning of Peters (1989), who suggested that organizations will 
need to proactively manage chaos (similarly defined as uncertainty) and channel its driver for 
constant innovation in order to succeed. 
 
 
Proposition 2: Risk management needs to consciously differentiate between “hard” and “soft” 
approaches to risk management in order to spur social innovation in public policy. 
 
The main risk management tool in public policy described in the aforementioned literature is 
regulation at a high level (especially Hood, 2002). Risk management thus follows a top-down 
direction. We suggest that tools, such as regulation and rules, can be summarized as “hard” risk 
management. It encompasses technocratic and rule/regulation-driven risk management set at a 
higher policy-level. Standards of behavior are set and guide actions at the implementing 
organizations. This provides a higher level of standardization in how risks are managed, but 
also leaves little to no room for personal decisions and risk evaluations at implementation level. 
 
In contrast, “soft” risk management tools refer to Renn’s (2008) risk governance approaches, 
based on communication and the adaptation of organizational culture that are also 
recommended by other authors (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Hood and Rothstein, 2000; 
Hood, 2002; Andreeva et al., 2014). Here, risk management decisions are delegated to the 
lowest possible level, such as line-managers of sometimes even frontline staff with regular 
communication on an individual and team basis. An example is social care, where assessments 
regarding suitability of service users for home care are conducted by frontline social workers. 
Guidelines are set on a decentralized level, although they may follow a broader national policy 
standard, which is monitored by a regulator or auditor. The goal of soft risk management tools 
is to create a pervasive culture of risk governance, in which individuals have a joint 
responsibility for finding the appropriate measure to address any particular risk. This can result 
in autonomous evaluations that are tailored to individual scenarios. This creates an opportunity 
to formulate and adopt social innovation. However, the necessary dilution of direct 
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responsibility can also mean that individuals may play the “blame game” at a lower level. Table 
1.1 summarizes this proposition. 
 
<TABLE X.1 HERE> 
 
Conclusion: A Public Policy Framework for Risk and Social Innovation 
 
Policy-makers never face only one type of risk in isolation. Rather, they must address risk and 
uncertainty constantly and simultaneously. For instance, there may be known risks for service 
users in care homes, such as their frailty and specific patient history. At the same time, there 
may be uncertainty about future funding for a new service, such as the cooperation between a 
care home with a primary school in the form of a befriending initiative. 
 
The holistic framework we propose in Table X.2 points to the most appropriate risk 
management approaches given a known risk or an uncertain situation. It also provides an insight 
on the kind of innovation that is most likely to succeed given the particular combination of risk 
type and risk management approach. 
 
<TABLE X.2 HERE> 
 
Hard risk management tools are best suited to manage known risks and provide the possibility 
for evolutionary innovation. Given the managerial focus, these risk management tools are more 
suited for top-down innovation as their structural framework is too rigid for grass-root 
innovation. This is not necessarily negative: the regulation of the medical and healthcare 
professions, for instance, requires governmentally set guidelines for quality standards (e.g. 
Flemig, 2015). Innovation in these fields consequently follows the same top-down mechanisms. 
When applied to uncertainty, however, hard risk management tools are likely to stifle social 
innovation. Since uncertainty cannot be specified a priori, hard risk management approaches 
are, as Mack (1971) argued, likely to deter policy makers from adopting innovative alternatives 
in favor of traditional options, such as top-down regulations. 
 
 17 
For known risks, this may mean that risk management at lower levels of the organization, i.e. 
the frontline staff and their immediate managers, may be more appropriate, as long as a minimal 
framework of standards is set. Both innovation and risk management are bottom-up in this case: 
With the power to address risk more fully at this grass-root stage, frontline staff can react more 
directly to new service user needs. Thus, soft risk management approaches are likely to result 
in expansionary innovation in the case of known risks. However, as Andreeva et al. (2014) 
caution, this diffusion of responsibility may also backfire and lead to a “blame game” when it 
comes to public accountability for the implementation of a policy (Hood, 2002). 
 
Finally, soft risk management approaches are suggested to manage uncertainty, leading to an 
organizational culture that “thrives on chaos” (Peters, 1989) and invites total innovation. This 
is dependent on a successful system of communication and joint decision-making across the 
implementing organization (Palermo, 2014). 
 
Thus, efficient risk governance in public policy that encourages social innovation is 
multifaceted and highly complex. It requires regulatory foresight and a shift in both policy and 
organizational culture – risk should no longer be seen from a strict actuarial, technocratic point 
of view that seeks to minimize it at all cost. Rather, risk should be actively considered as 
variable in social innovation. Individual incentives should be adjusted accordingly to foster a 
climate of innovation among policy-makers and implementing staff. Frequent and extensive 
inter- and intra-organizational communication and a diversification of responsibility emerge as 
the best tools in addressing public policy risks, in particular when it comes to reputational risks. 
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